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Introduction
There is a growing recognition that venture capitalists are a distinct and economically important type of investor. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the role of the organizational structure of venture capital firms. The most common organizational form in venture capital is through private equity partnerships. However, while the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited banks from holding equity for 65 years, banks in the US have been taking advantage of some loopholes to maintain a consistent presence in the venture capital market. This raises a number of interesting questions. What are banks' incentives when they behave as venture capitalists? And how do they differ from independent venture capitalists?
The most fundamental difference between a bank and an independent venture capital firm is simply that a bank also has its core banking business, selling loans and other financial services.
Our theoretical premise, therefore, is that bank venture capitalists may differ from independent venture capitalists because their venture investments may interact with their other banking activities. The literature on universal banking has long recognized that banks want to lever their skills and client relationships across a variety of financial products. This debate has generally focused on the cross-selling of different products by the bank at a point of time. However, the intertemporal expansion of banks' activities, in terms of using venture capital to invest in the early stages of a firm's life cycle, has received relatively little attention. Our paper takes a first step in this direction.
We draw on modern banking theory to examine the role of banks in venture capital.
There are two possible mechanisms by which banks can generate complementarities between their venture capital and lending activities: skills transfers and client relationships. A large literature suggests that banks are a unique type of investor (see e.g., Fama, 1985 , James, 1987 , and that banks have a comparative advantage at originating and screening loans. The importance of funding is diminishing, as witnessed by the enormous growth in securitization and loan sales (see e.g., James, 1988; Dahiya, et. al., 2002) . Thus, the value-added of banks is increasingly in the origination of deals (see e.g., Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995) . Moreover it has long been argued that banks play an important role in screening companies (see e.g., Stiglitz, 1985) . Our first hypothesis is thus that banks leverage their skills of originating and screening loan deals, and transfer them into the venture capital market. To empirically examine this we use and augment data from Venture Economics about the investments made by banks and independent venture capitalists, over the period 1980-2000. We examine the banks' propensity to make first round investments, and to do deals on their own. We find that banks are less, not more, likely to originate deals. Moreover, banks have a higher propensity to syndicate. The notion that banks have unique expertise at originating or screening deals appears not to be supported by the data.
Our second hypothesis relates to leveraging client relationships. The importance of the relationship between banks and their client companies is well documented in the banking literature. James (1987) , Lummer and McConnell (1989) , Best and Zhang (1993) , Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) among others find that new loans, loan renewals, and lender identity carry (positive) private information to the outside equity market about a borrowing firm's financial condition. And the literature on universal banking examines the extent to which banks should be allowed to exploit these client relationships across different financial services (see e.g., Benston, 1990 , Carow and Kane, 2001 , Puri, 1996 , Saunders and Walter, 1994 . Based on this body of work, the second hypothesis posits that banks invest in venture capital to forge relationships with potential future banking clients. Building client relationships thus generates strategic complementarities between a bank's venture investments and its traditional loan business (see Hellmann, 2002 , who develops the role of complementarities in a general theory of strategic venture investing).
To examine the second hypothesis we gather additional data from Compustat, Loan Pricing Corporation, and Moody's Manuals. We first examine whether banks target their venture investments in high debt industry, finding supportive evidence for that. Next, we test whether the companies that receive venture capital from banks are more likely to subsequently obtain loan financing. We find a strong relationship between banks making venture investments and companies subsequently raising loans. To further test for strategic complementarities, we go beyond the venture capital market and test whether relationships from venture capital also affect loan market outcomes. Using a McFadden choice model, we find that having a prior venture capital relationship significantly increases a bank's chance of participating in a company's loan deal. This result supports the hypothesis that building relationships in the venture capital market augments the bank's lending business.
Thus, our evidence provides no support for the first hypothesis that banks lever skills from the loan market into the venture capital market. But it does seem to support the second hypothesis that banks strategically invest in the venture capital market, seeking complementarities with their traditional loan business. These results show that the organizational form of venture capital matters in very distinct ways, affecting the role of the venture capitalist and the kind of investments made (see also Block and MacMillan, 1993, and Gompers and Lerner, 2000 , who examine the role of organizational form in the context of corporate venture capital).
We focus on the US market, but the issue at hand is of much broader concern. Banks are the dominant financial institutions in most countries (see Allen and Gale, 2000) . Policy makers in many of these countries want to develop their venture capital market. A natural instinct is to rely on their incumbent financial institutions, namely banks. Since banks are in every nook and corner, the infrastructure is already there. Hence allowing banks to do venture capital seems to be an easy way to make start-up capital available. However, it is important to understand banks' incentives when doing venture capital to assess how much progress can be expected. Our analysis provides a cautionary note against relying too much on banks to develop a venture capital industry. The US evidence suggests that banks may be driven by strategic objectives when investing in the venture capital market making them particularly reluctant to focus on early stage investments. Naturally, the lessons from the US may not necessarily translate directly to other countries, but our evidence does provide a first step in understanding banks' incentives when they engage in venture capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and discusses the regulatory environment. Section 3 examines the role of bank expertise. Section 4 examines the banks' strategic interest, focusing on their investments in the venture capital market. Section 5 examines the role of prior venture relationship in the loan market. Section 6 concludes.
The data
In this section we describe the data sources, the variables of interest, and the bank regulation surrounding banks in venture capital.
Data Sources
The data are compiled from several commercially available data sources, including Gompers, 1995 , Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001 , or Sahlman, 1990 ). Our definition also eliminates a potential data problem in SDC, namely that even within a single round there may be staging of disbursements, which could be mistaken as separate rounds (see Lerner, 1995 and SIC codes are reported, we determined for each VE code the 2-digit SIC code that is most frequently associated. We then used this mapping to assign SIC codes (and thus industry debt levels) to those companies that have only their VE codes reported. BANK is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor in the deal is a bank, 0 otherwise. Being a bank means that the deals was done by the bank itself or by a venture fund that is affiliated to the bank or bank holding company.
Data variables
IPO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company went public, 0 otherwise LOAN is a dummy variable that tales the value 1 if a company obtained a loan in LPC, 0
otherwise. This variable is obtained from LPC.
ORIGINATION is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is the company's first round, 0 otherwise. ROUND 2 (3,4) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is the company's second (third, fourth) round, 0 otherwise.
investor, 0 otherwise.
CLUSTER is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is in California or
Massachusetts, 0 otherwise.
AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of the total amount invested by all investors in a particular round.
YEAR controls relate to the year that the deal is made.
INDUSTRY controls are the Venture Economics industry categories at the one digit level.
DEBT is the natural logarithm of the average industry debt level for each portfolio firm. 4 Total debt is calculated for all companies in Compustat using the first 3 years of data. The industry average is the mean for each 2-digit SIC code.
DEBT/ASSET ratio is the average industry debt to asset ratio for each portfolio firm. 5 The debt to asset ratio is calculated for all companies in Compustat using the first 3 years of data. The industry average is the mean for each 2-digit SIC code.
From the LPC data set we identify all companies that obtain loans and that previously received venture financing from banks.
PORTFOLIO SHARE for bank i is a ratio. The numerator counts the number of companies that received both a loan and venture financing from bank i. The denominator counts the number of companies in our LPC sample that received venture financing from bank i.
MARKET SHARE for bank i is a ratio. The numerator counts the number of companies that received a loan from bank i. The denominator counts the total number of companies in our LPC sample.
LOANDEAL is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank participated in a loan to the company, 0 otherwise. PRIOR VC is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank made a prior venture investment in the company, 0 otherwise.
Background on regulation
Venture investments involve private equity participation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, passed in November 1999, allows banks to do various activities though the financial holding company. However, during our sample period, banks were yet to take advantage of this provision. Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks from buying stock in any corporation and from buying "predominately speculative" securities.
Nonetheless, there are two loopholes through which banks can make private equity investments which are relevant for our sample period.
First, there is a government program administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA), which allows for the creation of "Small Business Investment Corporations" (SBICs).
These SBICs can make equity investments and they may receive financial leverage from the SBA. The Small Business Act of 1958 authorized bank and bank holding companies to own and operate SBICs. A bank may place up to 20% of its capital in an SBIC subsidiary (10% at the holding company level). These investments are governed by the rules of the SBA and subject to regulatory review by that organization. An SBIC is also reviewed by the bank's regulators as a wholly owned subsidiary. SBA provisions include a limitation on the amount of the SBIC's funds that can be placed in a single company (less than 20%). Further, SBIC investments are subject to certain size restrictions. Currently, the SBA considers a business small when its net worth is $18 million or less and average annual net after-tax income for proceeding 2 years is not more than 6 million.
Second, bank holding companies can make equity investments subject to some limitations. Under Section 4(c)(6) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, bank holding companies may invest in the equity of companies as long as the position does not exceed more than 5% of the outstanding voting equity of the portfolio company. Some banks also invest in limited partnerships directly at the bank holding company level. Unlike SBICs, which are regulated by both the SBA and relevant bank regulators, bank holding companies are regulated only by the bank regulators.
Leveraging banks' strength into the venture capital market
The starting point of our analysis is that banks differ from independent venture capitalists in terms of their organizational form. The fundamental difference is that banks are different precisely because they also have their core banking business. The existence of this other line of business creates the potential for complementarities. We will examine two sources of complementarities: skills and client relationships.
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Our first hypothesis is that banks can lever their traditional loan market skills into the venture capital market. Banking theory suggests that banks have a comparative strength in originating loan deals. We examine whether this strength also extends to the venture industry.
We measure origination as the first round, where a company first received funding in the venture market. 7 We examine the fraction of origination in the overall portfolio by investor types. Table   2a reports the difference of means test, showing that banks have a lower propensity to originate deals (statistically significant at 1%). 8 Unlike in loan markets, banks do not seems to have a particular expertise at originating deals in the venture market.
Next, we examine the propensity to syndicate. Lerner (1994) suggests that investors can use syndication for a second opinion, to better screen a deal. A high propensity to syndicate might therefore signal lower screening ability. Similarly, Brander et. al. (2002) suggests that venture capitalist prefer to keep their best deals for themselves, so that a high propensity to 6 Naturally, there may be other exogenous factors that also influence bank behavior in the venture capital market, including regulation or risk preferences. We focus on strategic complementarities, since this hypothesis is driven by theory, and it allows us to understand universal banking more broadly. Note also that regulation or risk-preferences alone cannot explain the evidence presented below. Furthermore, there may be other differencesrelated to the investors' skills and incentives. These differences, however, are likely to be endogenous. For example, banks have a choice how much they what to emulate the incentives of independent venture capitalists. In the conclusion we further discuss how our analysis may shed some light on these endogenous differences. 7 Unfortunately, Venture Economics does not report who is the lead investor. This information would have been useful since often -albeit not always -the lead investor is the one who had the first contact with the entrepreneur. Knowing the lead investor might have given us a refined measurement of origination.
syndicate signals a lower ability to generate good deals. Table 2b shows the difference of means test, indicating that banks are more prone to syndicate (significant at 1%). This finding does not support the hypothesis that banks have special screening expertise that would allow them to avoid syndication.
To control for other deal characteristics, we use a Probit model, where the additional dependent variables are the amount of money raised in the round, the industry, and the year of the investment. We also control for whether the company is located in a venture capital cluster. The venture capital industry is highly concentrated, with California and Massachusetts accounting for 54.87% of all the deals in our sample. Table 3 shows that the effects for origination and syndication continue to hold in this multivariate environment. We also find that banks are relatively more active outside the cluster states of California and Massachusetts. This is intuitive since banks have large branching networks that may allow them to have relatively better access to deals outside the main venture capital clusters.
We also examine whether the reluctance to originate deals extends to early stage deals To examine this hypothesis we first ask whether banks focus on high debt industries. We examine the debt level of young public firms, defined as the first three years in Compustat. We consider both an absolute measure (namely the natural logarithm of the amount of debt) and a relative measure (namely the debt-to-asset ratio). The absolute measure is relevant in this context, since banks presumably care about the total demand for loans. Tables 2c and 2d use difference of means tests, finding that banks invest in industries with more debt, both in absolute and relative terms (significant at 1%). This is consistent with our second hypothesis: banks invest in those industry segments of the venture market that is populated by clients with a high demand for debt.
We then proceed to ask whether the companies that obtain venture financing from a bank are also more likely to obtain a loan in the future. We use the LPC database, which identifies all large loans from both private and public companies. A limitation of this database is that it does not capture many smaller loans, which do not have to be reported to the SEC. However, this only creates a bias against us, making it harder to find a relationship between venture investments and subsequent loan financing.
We examine whether bank-backed venture deals have a higher proportion of subsequent loans. Table 2e shows a difference of means test, indicating that bank deals are more likely to subsequently obtain a loan (significant at 1%). Table 4 reports results from two Probit models, where the independent variable is LOAN. The first model deliberately omits the deal characteristics that are already known at the time of the venture investment. The dependent variables are thus only BANK, the main variable of interest, and IPO, which controls for whether the company also went public. 9 The effect of banks is significant at 1%. The second model controls for those deal characteristics. We still find a significant relationship between obtaining venture financing from a bank and obtaining a loan (significant at 5%). We note that the size of the bank coefficient decreases by more than half between the first and second model. This suggests that observable deal characteristics explain more that half of correlation between banks' venture financing and obtaining a loan.
Even the remaining effect in the second model should only be interpreted as a correlation, and not as a causal relationship. This is because there may be other deals characteristics that are not observable to us as econometricians, but that banks observe when making their venture investments. To further examine this, we use a Bivariate Probit model. This test for the presence of unobservable deal characteristics, that simultaneously lead banks to make venture investments, and companies to obtain loans. Table 5 reports the results from the Bivariate Probit model, where the first equation estimates the probability of a bank making the venture investment (this corresponds to Table 3 ), and the second equation estimates the probability that the company in the deal subsequently obtains a loan (this corresponds to Table 4 ). The table reports a positive correlation in the error terms of the two equations, with an estimate (ρ) that is significant at 5%.
This suggests that, in addition to selecting their deals based on observable characteristics, banks also select their venture investments based on unobservable deal characteristics that are correlated with a higher likelihood of raising loans in the future.
Banks' strategic interest in venture capital: evidence from the loan market
The analysis of the previous section suggests that banks invest disproportionately in venture companies that subsequently obtain loans. To fully evaluate the second hypothesis, we also need to show that those venture investments strengthen a bank's position in the loan market.
For this, we investigate whether a prior relationship increases the likelihood that a bank will be selected as a company's loan provider.
We need a benchmark model of what the likelihood would be without a prior relationship. Since the loan market is extremely large and heterogeneous, we focus on the smaller segment that is directly relevant for us. In particular we consider the sample of loans obtained by all companies that previously received venture financing from some bank. Naturally, these companies can obtain a loan from any bank, not just the one that was their venture investor.
Indeed, the question we ask is whether these companies show any loyalty to their previous venture investor. 10 We want to examine whether banks are more likely to make loans among the companies it already knows, rather than the market for at large. For our first test, consider a bank (that invested in venture capital), and consider all the firms in its portfolio that raised a loan. We calculate the percentage of companies to which this bank provides a loan, and call this the PORTFOLIO SHARE. Intuitively, this measures how well the bank is doing in the microcosm of companies that it has a prior relationship with. We want to compare this to the macrocosm of companies, which includes all the companies that the bank has no prior relationships with.
MARKET SHARE is the percentage of companies that a given bank lends to in our sample. If relationships don't matter, then the microcosm should be representative for the macrocosm, i.e., a bank's PORTFOLIO SHARE should be the same as its MARKET SHARE. Table 6 reports that the average MARKET SHARE of a bank is 10.49%, whereas the average PORTFOLIO SHARE is 22.47%, the difference being significant at 5%. 11 This suggests that relationships matter, i.e., lending in the microcosm of firms with a prior relationship is different than lending to the market at large.
To further explore the role of relationships, we use data at the level of the individual deal.
We estimate a model that predicts the likelihood that a particular bank would have a match with a particular company in the loan market. This provides a more fine-grained test of whether a prior relationship affects the probability of a making a loan. A match is defined to occur if a firm takes a loan from a bank. Our sample consists of all possible pairings of banks that make both venture investment and loans, and firms that receive both bank venture investments and loans.
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We estimate two Logit models where the independent variable is always LOANDEAL, which is a dummy variable that indicates whether a particular firm obtained a loan from a particular bank. The main dependent variable of interest is whether the firm had a prior relationship with the particular bank. We also control for other bank characteristics, namely the 10 There is also a pragmatic reason for restricting the analysis to this subsample. For every loan we need to manually check whether the bank had a relationship at the venture stage, taking into account all relationships that resulted through bank mergers. 11 Note that the market shares do not need to sum up to one, since companies may have more than one lender.
percentage of companies that the bank made loans to in the market (MARKET SHARE). Our first specification uses a standard Logit model. For this we include firm-specific controls, such as industry, time of first venture capital investment or presence in a geographic cluster. Since observations for the same firm may be correlated, the specification allows for clustered standard errors. The second specification uses a conditional Logit model, also known as a McFadden choice model. This is a more powerful estimation method, since it controls for all possible firm characteristics by using firm fixed-effects. The only remaining dependent variables are thus the prior venture capital relationship, and other bank characteristics. Table 7 reports the results from these two models. We find that the coefficient on a prior venture relationship is large and highly significant in both models. The control variables also seem to have little effect. The results support the hypothesis that having a prior venture relationship significantly increases the likelihood of making a loan. 
Conclusion
This paper examines the role of banks in the venture industry. We find that banks tend to be followers as opposed to leaders in giving venture capital to start-ups. The evidence is not consistent with the notion that banks have superior origination and screening skills, which they could leverage into the venture market. In fact, the direction of leverage appears to be the reverse. The evidence is consistent with the notion that banks use their relationships from the venture capital market to strengthen their lending business. The paper shows that banks focus their venture investments on future loan candidates. Moreover, having a prior venture relationship increases the likelihood for a bank to make a loan.
12 As before, if a company raises a loan from more than one bank, we count this as each bank making a loan that that company. But if a bank makes a second loan to the same company, we do not count this as a separate observation. 13 In unreported regressions, we also took the analysis one step further and asked whether the nature of the venture relationship matter. We disaggregated the effect of a prior venture capital relationship into originator versus nonoriginator relationships, and found that origination does not create stronger loyalty in the loan market. Similarly, we also compared prior venture capital relationships that are based on sole investor versus syndicated deals, and found a similar result. This suggests that being an originator, or a sole investor does not provide an additional benefit in the loan market. Note that these results are internally consistent with our previous evidence that banks do not originate more deals, or do more deal on their own. Doing so does not seem to generate additional strategic benefits, in terms of creating stronger loyalty in the loan market.
The literature on universal banking has typically taken the static view of how banks can cross-sell an array of financial services to a given set of clients. This paper hopes to complement this view with a dynamic perspective of how banks can leverage their relationships across different stages a client's life cycle. Our evidence suggests that banks invest in venture capital for strategic reasons, namely to build relationships early.
The analysis has several important implications. Our prior research established the importance of value-adding support in venture capital (Hellmann and Puri, 2000, 2002) . Some observers argue that banks often fail to provide such value-adding support, and point to lack of expertise or incentives inside banks. But incentives and expertise are endogenous, so that it can be argued that banks could acquire expertise or implement better incentives. Our analysis can potentially reconcile these arguments. We find that banks are mainly concerned with building future lending relationships, and focus mainly on later stage, syndicated venture deals. As a result they may not have as compelling a need to develop expertise for value-adding support, which matters precisely at the early stage. The differences in expertise and incentives for bank venture capitalists may thus be a consequence of a fundamentally different fund strategy. Further exploring the differences in the value-adding dimension is an important topic for future research.
Understanding the role of banks in venture capital is also important for the development of venture capital markets outside the US. Policy makers in numerous countries have tried to facilitate the development of their own venture capital industry. Some policies focus on the supply of start-ups. Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2002) argue that incumbent corporations may play an important role, especially for spawning off technologies and entrepreneurs. Other policies focus on the supply of venture capital. Again, a natural instinct of policy makers is to rely on incumbent financial institutions, typically banks (Becker and Hellmann, 2003) . Black and Gilson (1997) argue that in bank-dominated economies the lack of active stock markets is an obstacle for venture capital. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
The unit of analysis is a deal, which is the unique matching between a company and an investor. BANK is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor in the deal is a bank; 0 otherwise. ORIGINATION is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is the company's first round, 0 otherwise. ROUND 2, ROUND 3 and ROUND 4, which take a value of 1 if the deal is a 2 nd , 3 rd or 4 th round; 0 otherwise. SYNDICATION is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the round has more than one investor; 0 otherwise. CLUSTER is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company is located in a geographical core segment of the venture capital industry, namely California or Massachusetts; 0 otherwise. AMOUNT measures the natural logarithm of the amount of financing raised by the company in the particular round. TOTAL AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of the dollar amount raised by the company across all rounds. INDUSTRY DEBT is the natural logarithm of the average absolute debt level for young firms in the portfolio firm's industry; and INDUSTRY DEBT/ASSET is the average debt to asset ratio for young firms in the portfolio firm's industry. Table 2 Difference of means tests
All tables provide a difference of means test for BANKS versus INDEPENDENT VCs. Table 3 This table presents the results of two Probit regressions. The dependent variable is BANK, which takes the value 1 if the deal investor is a bank; 0 otherwise. The independent variables are ORIGINATION, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is a first round, 0 otherwise; ROUND 2, ROUND 3 and ROUND 4, which take a value of 1 if the deal is a 2 nd , 3 rd or 4 th round; 0 otherwise; SYNDICATION, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the round is syndicated, 0 otherwise; CLUSTER, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company is in California or Massachusetts, 0 otherwise; AMOUNT, which is the natural logarithm of the amount of financing raised by the company in the particular round; INDUSTRY, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the one-digit Venture Economics code; and YEAR, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the year when the deal occurred. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted and allow for correlation of observations for the same investor. In parenthesis we report z-scores. Table 4 This table presents the results of a Probit regression. The dependent variable is LOAN, which takes the value 1 if the company obtains a loan, 0 otherwise; The independent variables are BANK, which takes the value 1 if the deal investor is a bank; 0 otherwise; IPO, which takes the value 1 if a company went public; 0 otherwise; ORIGINATION, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is a first round, 0 otherwise; ROUND 2, ROUND 3 and ROUND 4, which take a value of 1 if the deal is a 2 nd , 3 rd or 4 th round; 0 otherwise; SYNDICATION, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the round is syndicated, 0 otherwise; CLUSTER, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company is in California or Massachusetts, 0 otherwise; AMOUNT, which is the natural logarithm of the amount of financing raised by the company in the particular round; INDUSTRY, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the one-digit Venture Economics code; and YEAR, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the year when the deal occurred. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted and allow for correlation of observations for the same investor. In parenthesis we report z-scores. Table 5 This table presents the results of a Bivariate Probit regression. The dependent variables are LOAN, which takes the value 1 if the company obtains a loan, 0 otherwise; and BANK, which takes the value 1 if the deal investor is a bank; 0 otherwise. The independent variables are IPO, which takes the value 1 if a company went public; 0 otherwise; ORIGINATION, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is a first round, 0 otherwise; ROUND 2, ROUND 3 and ROUND 4, which take a value of 1 if the deal is a 2 nd , 3 rd or 4 th round; 0 otherwise; SYNDICATION, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the round is syndicated, 0 otherwise; CLUSTER, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company is in California or Massachusetts, 0 otherwise; AMOUNT, which is the natural logarithm of the amount of financing raised by the company in the particular round; INDUSTRY, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the one-digit Venture Economics code; and YEAR, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the year when the deal occurred. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted and allow for correlation of observations for the same investor. In parenthesis we report z-scores. Table 6 This table shows the results of a paired-t-test of equality for PORTFOLIO SHARE and MARKET SHARE, which are variables that are computed for all 23 banks that made both venture investments and loans in our LPC sample. PORTFOLIO SHARE indicates the number of companies that received a loan from a bank with a prior venture capital relationship, divided by the number of companies funded by the bank that are in our LPC sample. MARKET SHARE is number of companies that received a loan from a bank divided by the total number companies in our LPC sample.
Mean
Standard Table 7 This table presents the results from two Logit regressions. The data consist of all possible pairs of companies that received bank venture financing and a loan in LPC, with any bank that made venture capital investments gave a loan to those companies. The dependent variable is LOANDEAL, which takes a value of 1 if the specified bank in the pair gave a loan to the company in the pair. The independent variables are PRIOR VC, which takes a value of 1 if the bank financed that particular company in the venture market, 0 otherwise and MARKET SHARE, which is number of companies that received a loan from a bank divided by the total number companies in our LPC sample. The first model uses the following firm-specific control variables: IPO, which takes the value 1 if a company went public; 0 otherwise; CLUSTER, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company is in California or Massachusetts, 0 otherwise; AMOUNT, which is the natural logarithm of the amount of financing raised by the company in the particular round; INDUSTRY, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the one-digit Venture Economics code; and YEAR1, which is a set of unreported dummy variables for the year when the first venture capital deal occurred. The first model uses a standard Logit model, where the standard errors allow for correlation of observations for the same investor. Models II estimates a conditional Logit model, which includes fixed effects for each firm. In parenthesis we report z-scores. 
